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FOREWORD
Much discussion has occurred over a possible
“clash of civilizations” between the Muslim world and
the West for the last decade. While controversial, the
“clash” thesis has had a large influence in the debate
over the causes of, and possible remedies for, the
spread of terrorist activity.
Dr. Douglas Macdonald argues that the social
identity theory behind the “clash” thesis is useful for
analyzing the tasks before us in the “Long War” on
Terrorism. The “clash of civilizations” is not actually
occurring, he argues, but is rather the end goal of
radical Islamist political grand strategy. This is largely
the result of the totalitarian nature of the beliefs of
the radical Islamist terrorists: like the Fascists and
Communists before them, they ultimately cannot allow
alternative value systems to exist in areas they control.
Their goal is to spread such totalitarian beliefs to the
ummah, that is, the entire Muslim world, in order to
create a violent “clash” with non-Muslim societies, and,
in some versions, radical Islam is expected to spread
to the entire world. Unlike some recent academic
calls for negotiations with the radical Islamists and
arguments that their goals are limited and negotiable,
Dr. Macdonald argues that the first thing to understand
about the enemy is that there is nothing to negotiate
with them because of their radical totalitarian nature.
He warns that, historically, Western liberals have had
difficulty understanding this type of threat.
Dr. Macdonald argues that the first imperative of any
strategy in the “Long War” on Terror must be to prevent
such a totalitarian ummah from being created in order
to prevent a “clash of civilizations.” This can best be
iii

accomplished by supporting the majority of mainstream
Muslims, rewarding moves towards moderation, and
avoiding unnecessary irritants to Muslim sensibilities.
He also argues that we should promote the adoption of
“dual identities,” one Muslim, one national, to detract
from the lure of pan-Islamism. This approach has been
adopted in separatist insurgencies in Indonesia and the
Philippines, and initial results are encouraging, at least
in Indonesia. The singular “national identity” approach
in Thailand has been much less successful thus far, and
already has failed in the Philippines. Perhaps more
controversial to some, he also advocates continuing
to support the spread of democracy and free markets,
despite inherent resistance to such “Globalization,” as
a part of the “Long War” on Terrorism. But this also
must be accompanied by robust security vigilance.
Such combined strategies of attraction and attrition, he
feels, are the most likely to succeed over the long run.
The debate over grand strategy in the “Long War”
on Terrorism is a robust one. Dr. Macdonald’s use
of social identity theory to provide a framework to
understand the terrorist enemy and how to deal with
him moves that debate forward. The Strategic Studies
Institute is pleased to present that analytical framework
for our readers’ consideration.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Academic and journalistic critics of the American
“Long War” on Terrorism (LWT) who are calling for
negotiations with radical Islamist groups, to attempt to
appease such groups by meeting their allegedly limited
demands, or to accept that they do not represent a
major threat to the United States and its interests, are
fundamentally wrong. There are many reasons for
this, but the major flaw in such reasoning is a lack
of understanding of the ideologically-driven grand
political strategy of the Islamist extremists, which
represents a totalitarian, transnational, and, in many
versions, universalist social revolutionary movement.
Moderate rationalists steeped in bargaining over
flexibly defined interests have difficulty understanding
the rigidity of historical “necessity” or moral
imperatives in the totalitarian mindset. Policy advice
that flows from such misunderstanding is therefore
fatuous, if not dangerous. A proper understanding of
the grand political strategy chosen by the terrorists is a
prerequisite for constructing effective counterpolicies.
A useful framework for understanding the
ideology and grand political strategy of extremist
Islamist terrorist groups such as those affiliated with
al-Qa’ida is through the use of social identity theories.
The radical Islamists are attempting to alter the social
identity of the entire Muslim world (the ummah) in a
direction of civilizational unity in order to struggle
subsequently against other civilizational groups, often
defined religiously, but including secular humanists
also. Samuel Huntington’s theory of an emerging
“clash of civilizations” may or may not have a universal
applicability, but it is highly relevant to studying the
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grand political strategy of certain Islamist extremist
groups. Radical Islamist group leaders such as Osama
bin Laden and Indonesia’s Emir Abu Bakar Bashir
openly advocate such a clash in civilizational social
identity terms. Indeed, bin Laden has declared that it
already has been begun by the West.
The ideas behind the political grand strategy to bring
about a clash of civilizations have long historical roots.
Yet they evolved rapidly into more terrorist means
following the 1967 Arab war with Israel. Ideally, the
strategy was to follow two stages. The first stage was
to be the overthrow of secularist or moderate Muslim
governments, the “near enemy,” to unify the ummah
under strict sharia (Islamist, God-given, Koranic) law
and totalitarian Islamist political leadership. The second
was to be a now-unified ummah confronting the rest of
the world, the “far enemy,” with the ultimate triumph
of radical Islam on a global scale. This timetable was
upset, and the political grand strategy altered, when
the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
invaded Afghanistan in 1979. This led to attacks on the
Soviet “far” enemy, and the radicalizing and unifying
experience of defeating the Soviets in that country.
Muslims from all over the ummah participated in the
Afghani jihad. Returning veterans of the anti-Soviet
war often created radical Islamist movements upon
their return to their country of origin, for example,
Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. Once the Soviets were
defeated, the radical Islamists turned to attacking the
“far” and “near” enemies simultaneously in the 1990s,
with the “far” enemy receiving snowballing attention.
The invasion of Iraq in 1991, and the stationing of
allied troops in Saudi Arabia to deter and maintain a
sanctions regime against Saddam Hussein, captured
the attention of the radical Islamists and, with the
viii

collapse of the USSR, placed the United States first
on the list among the “far enemies.” What bin Laden
and others perceived as the tepid American response
to various provocations, and earlier American
withdrawals from Vietnam in 1975, Beirut in 1983, and
Somalia in 1993, among other examples, as well as the
heady success of defeating the former Soviet Union in
Afghanistan, emboldened the radical Islamists to the
point of occasional delusions of grandeur. Attacks on
Americans and U.S. interests continued periodically
throughout the 1990s, culminating in the destruction
of the Twin Towers in New York City on September
11, 2001 (9/11). The subsequent American-led allied
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq cemented the
position of the United States as the great enemy of
Islam to the extremists, and even many moderates.
The radical Islamists have used these developments
in their recruiting efforts, arguing that the United
States has declared war on Islam. They also state this
in civilizational social identity terms. Anger in the
Muslim world at American actions has offered some
recruitment opportunities for the radical Islamists. But
thus far they have failed to shape the consciousness
of the vast majority of Muslims in a civilizational
direction of their choosing. A top priority of American
foreign policy must be that this pan-Islamic political
grand strategy continues to fail.
The study makes the following policy recommendations:
1. A greater coordination of efforts, both material
and ideational, with allies to prevent the LWT from
turning into a “clash of civilizations” over social
identities as planned by radical Islamist terrorists;
2. More sophisticated and less ethnocentric
outreach programs to the non-Western world to
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explain the American role in and the potential benefits
of Globalization to moderate groups, and a greater
emphasis on areas of value congruence;
3. The implementation of a combined “attrition/
attraction” strategy in dealing with insurgent groups;
and,
4. The promotion of a moderate nationalism and
“dual identities” to fend off the potential appeals of a
widespread change toward a civilizational identity in
the Muslim world, even if at the short-term expense of
American economic interests.



THE NEW TOTALITARIANS:
SOCIAL IDENTITIES AND RADICAL ISLAMIST
POLITICAL GRAND STRATEGY
So let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also
direct attention to our common interests and the means
by which those differences can be resolved. And if we
cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make
the world safe for diversity. For in the final analysis, our
most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small
planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our
children's futures. And we are all mortal.1
President John F. Kennedy, June 1963

Radical Islamist groups resolutely reject this
pluralistic and liberal vision of world order articulated
by President Kennedy in 1963.2 The war between these
groups and America is more than a mere struggle for
power, as many self-proclaimed “Realists” would have
it, although it is that. It is also a battle over core values.
Because of this, the greatest security threat facing the
United States in the early 21st century is the terrorist
activity propagated by Islamist extremists.3
Although the primary American response understandably has been military and security-oriented in
the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), this threat
cannot be met by material means and methods alone.
As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine General
Peter Pace put it in late 2005, in this war “ideas are as
important as bullets.”4 Australian foreign minister
Alexander Downer agrees: “The campaign against this
misinterpretation of Islam by terrorist groups involves
a battle of ideas.”5 It is that realm of ideas in terms of
extreme Islamist political grand strategy, of which
its military grand strategy is only one subordinate


element, which this monograph seeks to analyze and
explain.6
What follows is an analysis of the political grand
strategy of a particular type of that extremism, that is,
the attempt to unite the entire Muslim world under
an Islamist political order, a politicized transnational
ummah, or Muslim community, stretching from
Morocco (in some versions, Spain and Portugal) to
the Philippines, and from Nigeria and Mauritania to
Uzbekistan. This is the ultimate goal of the political
grand strategy of al-Qa’ida and associated Islamist
groups in other regions such as Jemaah Islamiya and
Abu Sayyaf in Southeast Asia, although sometimes an
eventual global Muslim ummah is also posited, at least
in their most radical incantations. This virulent strain
of Islamism presents the greatest threats to American
interests, including homeland defense, through the
systematic use of terrorist violence.7
ANALYTICAL CAVEATS
Some brief analytical caveats are in order. For the
sake of brevity, understanding, and ease of communication, analytical generalizations must be made. I have
attempted to be judicious in doing so. Groups will be
discussed at times as if they were unified and coherent
entities, although they not always are.8 It is useful to
remember that, on an individual basis, people coming
from the same socio-economic groupings, the same
countries, the same religion, the same region, even the
same family, can have very different reactions to their
environment and external stimuli. Individual choices
must be made in becoming a terrorist or supporting
terrorist behavior.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to identify those group
dynamics that make such choices more likely if we


hope to eradicate, to the extent possible, such choices
being made in the first place. Most people would agree
that this is the ideal way to fight terrorism: eliminate it
from occurring, that is, in social science jargon, prevent
the in-group political processes from regenerating the
terrorist organization through recruitment.9 There are
former terrorists, but a better strategy would be to
influence these people in a moderate direction before
they join in the violence. As Jerrold Post, a psychiatrist
experienced in dealing with captured terrorists, puts
it, “Terrorists whose only sense of significance
comes from being terrorists cannot be forced to give
up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their
very reason for being.” [Emphasis in the original.]10
Prevention is thus the best counterstrategy. But prior
to creating a preventative strategy, we must first try
to understand what the extreme Islamists are trying to
accomplish.
Secondly, much of the content of the Islamist
political grand strategy that is accessible comes
from public statements of its leaders, the writings
of influential radical thinkers, or the statements of
captured terrorists. These sources could be filled
with disinformation, misinformation, bravado,
“cheerleading,” recruitment overtures, and the like.
Doctrinal statements are sometimes contradictory,
even within the same document. This is because it is
likely that extremist Islamist spokesmen contract or
expand their messages, depending on the primary
target audience.11
Clearly, many of their statements and apparent
beliefs are contradictory. The leader of the al-Qa’idaaffiliated, Indonesian-based Islamist terror group
Jemaah Islamiya,12 Abu Bakar Bashir, for example,
supported the view at various times in the same


interview that the ultimate goal of his group is: a) a
Muslim “super state” limited to Southeast Asia; b)
a transnational caliphate encompassing the entire
Muslim world; and/or, c) a world in which there will
be no non-Muslims at all.13 With this sort of strategic
flexibility—some would argue strategic incoherence—
it is difficult, although not impossible, to explicate
a rational strategy held by leading members of the
important terror organizations.
The widespread repetition of major themes and
stated goals over time, actions taken that are within the
parameters of and seemingly inspired by these political
grand strategic claims, and the existence of similar ideas
in all sorts of captured intelligence materials worldwide
which have demonstrated clear communications and
connections among the groups, all strongly suggest
that, varied utopian goals notwithstanding, there is a
coherent political grand strategy that can be understood
as animating and loosely coordinating extreme Islamist
terrorism of this type. This political grand strategy also
is supported by a distinctive military grand strategy to
attain the political goals. The extreme Islamists have
been quite forthcoming in advocating those plans. But
do they mean what they say? Or are such ideas merely
so much palaver to string along the gullible, as many
“Realists” might argue?
An instructive lesson can be drawn from the study
of the former Soviet Union following the Cold War and
the partial opening of confidential files of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Contrary to what
revisionist Sovietologists and “Realists” would have
predicted, no great disparity existed between what
was being said privately by the regime in its inner
sanctum and what was being said publicly. These
analysts predicted that privately Soviet leaders would


have eschewed ideology and spoken in the sparse,
instrumental tones of realpolitik. That is, they predicted
that the USSR would be shown to be a “normal” great
power, not an ideologically-driven state.
Unfortunately for this view, the records did
not demonstrate that when finally released. To be
sure, at times tactics and instrumental policies were
discussed in blunt realpolitik terms. Some separation
was made between issues of “principle” and issues of
“propaganda.” But for the most part, the Soviet leaders
spoke in ideological terms, sought ideologicallyderived goals, viewed the United States and other
non-Leninist regimes in ideological terms, and were
constrained by the tenets of their belief systems in
most areas of policy. As one of the foremost historians
of Stalinist diplomacy, Vojtech Mastny, noted in 1996:
Perhaps the greatest surprise so far to have come out of
the Russian archives is that there was no surprise: the
thinking of the insiders conformed substantially to what
Moscow was publicly saying. Some of the most secret
documents could have been published in Pravda without
anybody’s noticing. There was no double bookkeeping;
it was the single Marxist-Leninist one whose defects
spelled the bankruptcy of the Soviet enterprise in the
long run.14

This same reluctance to believe the ideological
statements of the extreme Islamists among Western
analysts remains a problem today.15 James Robbins
argues that the fundamental problem lies in the liberal
Enlightenment-driven mindset and its endemic, reified
rationalism:
Western liberals, who prize reason, are subject to
the tendency to explain away beliefs they consider
unreasonable. Progress and freedom are inevitable
because they are the natural courses of history.


Ideologies that do not fit our predetermined vision of the
future are not worth taking seriously. Extremism cannot
triumph because it does not make sense. Therefore, the
Bolsheviks and their successors were not really after
global Communist revolution, even though they said
they were. The Nazis would not really commit armed
aggression and genocide, even though they advocated
both. And while Khmer Rouge military leader Khieu
Samphan's 1959 doctoral thesis identified the urban
bourgeoisie as a parasite class that had to be removed
to the countryside, they wouldn't really empty Phnom
Penh of its 2.5 million citizens and subject them to
collectivization, reeducation, and execution, would
they? Isn't that just plain crazy?16

Tragically, these belief systems did not turn out to
be “crazy” in the events, but rather, in retrospect,
consisted of warnings misunderstood by many. Even
among the ranks of the most vile radicals, moderate
rationalists will attempt to find signs of corresponding
moderation in them, at least enough to “do business.”
It is an article of liberal and “Realist” faith.17
Yet while liberals and other moderate rationalists
think in terms of interests, many of which are malleable
and can be bargained over and compromised as in
liberal political systems, extremist Islamists think
in terms of moral imperatives and goals that are fixed
and unassailable.18 Among their catalog of crimes
committed by moderate, secular, or “apostate” Muslim
governments and groups is exactly that they “do
business” with the non-Islamic world. Unless they can
be deprogrammed to think in different ways, they have
to be incarcerated or killed. There is no compromise.
The 9/11 Commission called the cause of that
horrible day primarily a “failure of imagination.” We
cannot afford such failures in the future. Until proven
otherwise, the radical Islamists must be taken at their
word.


This monograph proceeds as follows: an examination of radical Islamism as a totalitarian ideology and
its similarities with other totalitarian ideologies; a
general overview of what comprises a political grand
strategy, as opposed to the more narrow subset of
military grand strategy; the ideational template of
the extreme Islamist political grand strategy and its
interconnection with their military strategy; and some
implications for U.S. policies, with some modest policy
recommendations.
RADICAL ISLAMISM AS TOTALITARIANISM
I argue here, in contrast to some recent observers,
that the radical Islamists are not driven toward a
“political, limited, and evasive war of attrition” that
makes a negotiated settlement possible, if not likely, as
a Harvard scholar would have it.19 Nor are they merely
following a limited strategic logic based on national
liberation from “occupying” armies, as other scholars
aver.20 Nor has the American response to 9/11 been an
overreaction to a relatively isolated event, as a Pulitzer
Prize-winning historian would have us believe.21 Nor
is the terrorist threat largely a figment of the American
imagination, as some academics appear to argue.22
These views merely describe Islamist short-term
tactics for the current situation, which the terrorists
themselves have declared to be temporary, without
any attention given to the long-term and ultimate
goals of the extremist Islamist social and political
movement, that is, to its totalistic ideology. Rather,
an examination of the political grand strategy of the
Islamists demonstrates that they place no inherent
limits on either the ends they seek or the means they
are willing to utilize in pursuit of those ends.


Moreover, the extremist Islamist political belief
system is totalitarian, that is, it ultimately forbids value
and moral pluralism (which often is referred to as a
form of “polytheism” and a rejection of the one true
God)23 and claims the exclusive right to determine
the entire way of life of people under its control. Like
Fascism domestically and Leninism universally, radical
Islamism seeks the complete eradication of alternative
forms of moral, social, and political thought. Some
versions desire this totalitarian goal for the ummah,
that is, the Muslim world as defined by them. Other
versions, as we shall see in the statements of Jemaah
Islamiya co-founder Abu Bakar Bashir, an Indonesian
cleric, aim at gaining the entire world for their view
of Islamism. It is therefore incorrect to state, as has
CNN’s Peter Bergen in an otherwise very valuable
book, that radical Islamism has “articulated no vision
of the world it aims to create.”24 Although some parts
of this articulated set of ultimate goals remain vague
and varying definitions have been articulated, this is
not unusual for any ideology.
What follows is not an attempt to pour new wine
into old bottles, or to force the current dilemmas faced
into a World War II or Cold War framework. Yet the
United States and the other liberal states of the world
have faced totalitarians before, and it would be foolish
for us not to learn from those experiences what we can,
as different as they were in many respects. As we shall
see, there are also many key similarities with those
movements of the past, both in their political nature
and in their policies in challenging liberalism.
Since totalitarianism is a contested concept, further
explanation of what is meant here is in order.25 Though
for analytical coherence disparate groups and their
members will be lumped under similar categories (for
example, radical Islamist, Jemaah Islamiya, al-Qa’ida,


etc.), it should be emphasized that few such groups are
truly monolithic. This raises the important question
of whether a totalitarian system has to be highly
centralized, as one might intuitively assume, to qualify
as totalitarian. I argue here that it does not.
An almost universal belief in the counter terror
literature is that al-Qa’ida and its global affiliates are
loosely organized groups pursuing similar ultimate
ends.26 This centrifugal tendency has increased in
the aftermath of the invasions of Afghanistan and
Iraq by coalition troops following 9/11.27 Factional
disagreements over the means and pace of achieving
those ends are virtually inevitable, as they are among
all ideological groupings, perhaps especially among
totalitarian ones. Yet such groups have enough
organizational and ideological contact based on
financial and social networks, and general agreement
on comparable ultimate ends, so that they can function
as a decentralized yet coherent force that is especially
difficult to counter for that very reason. Similarities in
strategies and tactics of other totalitarian ideologies
therefore become useful for typological comparison.
The Leninists, for example, like the extremist
Islamists, compare somewhat in their emphasis on a
small, conspiratorial elite whose task is to raise the
consciousness of inattentive masses and spread their
belief system globally and universally.
A comparison with the totalitarian regime par
excellence, Nazi Germany, may help demonstrate the
point more clearly. Most people think of a totalitarian
system as a highly unified, monolithic, highly
disciplined polity, but that is hardly the case. It is
rather the scope of the political, that is, what areas of
life the state, party, or leadership can interfere in, that
largely makes a political system totalitarian or not. A
totalitarian system, in fact, can be quite decentralized


in many ways. As the late Sir Alan Bullock insightfully
noted, what made Nazism and Leninism totalitarian
was not that the government could intervene in
people’s lives everywhere—that is impossible. It is that
the totalitarian polity can intervene anywhere—thereby
creating an expectation of interference that does not
take day-to-day supervision or complete behavioral
control to implement. Setting the strategic goals and
inspiring local innovation is enough to create a de facto
totalitarian relationship.28
Radical Islamism is somewhat akin to how Ian
Kershaw describes the Nazi system (reputedly one of
the most centralized regimes in history): Hitler at the
center, setting the tone, financing activities, creating
the limits (or lack thereof), and the general direction
of the movement and government, with thousands of
“little Hitlers,” including not only top Nazis but also
the gauleiters (provincial party leaders) and their staffs
chosen from the “old fighters” for their sympathetic
brutality and street training in systematic cruelty,
and various other thugs filling the middle leadership
positions in the bureaucracy. The “little Hitlers”
spent their energy “working toward the Fuehrer,”
that is, anticipating the wishes of the leader from
his statements, ideology, and actions, but taking the
initiative locally.29
The al-Qa’ida global network is best understood
as “little bin Ladens” financed, trained, and guided
from “the base,” but planning attacks according to
local conditions and capabilities. As bin Laden himself
said of the 1998 bombings of two American embassies
in Africa: “Our job is to instigate and, by the grace of
God, we did that, and certain people responded to this
instigation.”30 It is a part of a “think globally, act locally”
political grand strategy relying on distinct signals given
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from the top. Following a spate of bombings seemingly
“instigated” by a public message from al-Qa’ida’s
primary ideologist in late 2005, terrorism expert Walid
Phares noted: “It’s like the ‘Prime Minister Zawahiri’s’
note comes first, and then the local leader has his
note.”31
Let us be clear: bin Laden is not Hitler, and al-Qa’ida
is not a Great Power. It is not even a state. Yet enough
similarities are apparent between their organizational
behavior in the pursuit of totalitarian ends, and in
the role of how their ideas shape their policies that
therefore lead to systemized actions, to warrant useful
comparisons for understanding the nature of the
movements. And their respective ultimate goals are
clearly totalitarian: the political, social, theological,
and/or moral exclusion of all other forms of thought
in a particular political entity, or even universally, as
an ultimate goal. The level of analysis at which that
political entity is pursued as an active policy—whether
communal, national, regional, or global—is a matter
of shifting tactical priorities based on perceptions of
immediate political fortunes and levels of resistance
that have to be faced. But the goals remain fixed.
Additional organizational similarities exist between
the radical Islamists and other totalitarian movements.32
The Islamists, Nazis, and Leninists, for example,
share the disdain for, in fact outright opposition to,
the separation of public and private lives, a hallmark
of liberalism. As Robert Ley, the Nazi director of the
German Labor Front, put it with typical cynicism: “The
only people who still have a private life in Germany
are those who are asleep.”33 Totalitarians’ respective
belief systems are complete ways of life, and intrude into
every area of human activity, at least in the abstract.34
Islamism is no less encompassing for its adherents. As
bin Laden put it bluntly as recently as 2004: “Islam is
11

one unit that can not be divided,” and “a way of life
revealed by God for men to abide by all of its aspects
in all their affairs.”35
Radical Islamist theorist the late Syed Abul A’La
Mawdudi made a comparison to other totalitarian
ideologies even more explicit. Writing of the shariaruled state, he noted that it:
. . . cannot restrict the scope of its activities. Its approach
is universal and all-embracing . . . (sic) In such a state
no one can regard any field of his affairs as personal
and private. Considered from this aspect the Islamic
state bears a kind of resemblance to the Fascist and
Communist states.36

This is not irrational behavior as some critics of ideology
would have it. But it consists of an ends-means analysis
carried out within a restricted cognitive framework
severely bounded by a system of values, in this case
religiously driven.37
Such fixed, totalitarian ends of the Islamists open up
the possibility of truly expansive means to pursue them.
A fundamental mistake made by those who denigrate
ideology and belief systems as useful analytical tools
is to view contradictory behavior that is difficult to
square with the stated ideals of the ultimate goals of
the belief system as evidence that those ideals do not
matter, or at least do not matter much. The fanatic
always has puzzled the moderate or skeptic, and they
are reluctant to believe that the former really exists in
a position of power, preferring to see ideology as some
sort of ideational gloss used to cover “real” motivations,
which are materialistic and interest-based.38
Yet the domestic revolutionary ends of both Nazism
and Leninism were implemented incrementally
through a series of temporary compromises with
political reality, by “revolution by installments” or
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revolution by “dosage” respectively.39 As Bullock notes,
“Like Hitler, Stalin could afford to be an opportunist
because, unlike his opponents, he was clear about his
aims.”40 Such temporary tactical, expedient behavior
does not disprove anything about an ideologist and
his ultimate goals. Totalitarianism thus remains a
useful analytical tool for understanding the behavior
of groups or organizations that adhere to such an
ideology or belief system if one assumes that there will
be sporadic contradictions between ideas and behavior,
as there must be for an ideologist in power (as opposed
to sitting on the sidelines.)41
We often define something partly by what it is not,
and this is also true for radical Islamism. There are many
other, mainstream Muslim groups—which comprise
the majority of the Muslim world—that are more open
to the adoption of pluralistic ideals, find a “live-andlet-live” ecumenical ethos congenial politically, and
believe Islam to be compatible with these beliefs. This
is especially true in Southeast Asian Islam for historical
reasons that we need not go into here. As we shall see,
this contention between pluralism and totalitarianism
is a major source of a long-term identity crisis in the
Muslim world that has gathered force once again
since the beginning of the latest self-conscious Muslim
cultural and political “revival” emerging at least from
the 1950s, but more probably from the creation of the
state of Israel in 1948.42 It is also a basis of the war
being waged between the radical Islamists and those
Muslims who disagree with them, the “near enemy.”
POLITICAL GRAND STRATEGY
Grand strategy in its most basic form is the overall
geostrategic plan that a political entity has in place
to protect or pursue its interests and core values, no
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matter how they are defined. A political grand strategy
must include political, economic, social, ideational, and
other factors, as all impinge on the political process
in some way. More specifically, there are three areas
of immediate concern in political grand strategy, in
contrast to the normal military formulation of endsways-means: ends, means, and enemies. Political enemies
are chosen in part because of their capabilities, but
it is their ends that are in contradiction that creates
the political conflict in the first place. Political grand
strategies, then, are at once both abstract templates
of ultimate ends and proposed concrete actions to
achieve those ends, the latter being the means used
in pursuit of the former. They also have much to do
with identifying who is the enemy in the sense of those
presenting obstacles or threats to the implementation
of the political grand strategy.43
Ends and the Battle of Ideas.
The ends of a political grand strategy are the
ultimate goals being sought by the political entity, be
it an alliance, a state, a party, a political movement,
an insurgency, or a terrorist group. The late American
strategist, John R. Boyd, argued that the basis for
any grand strategy required a political “unifying
vision” and historical mission that would cohere all
contributory actions into one avowed direction: a set
of ultimate political goals in the form of a particular
political order. Political grand strategy, as defined
here, requires:
A grand ideal, overarching theme, or noble philosophy
that represents a coherent paradigm within which
individuals as well as societies can shape and adapt to
unfolding circumstances—yet offers a way to expose
flaws of competing or adversary systems. Such a unifying
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vision should be so compelling that it acts as a catalyst
or beacon around which to evolve those qualities that
permit a collective entity or organic whole to improve its
stature in the scheme of things.44

Terrorist political visions typically, but not always,
contain an idealized version of a “lost paradise,”45 an
idealized prediction of a brilliant future, or a “found
paradise,” and an extremely negative view of the
status quo. The unacceptable status quo serves as the
main recruitment tool in seeking new adherents and
new actions. It remains a truism: one is less likely to
act riskily for change if one is satisfied with the way
things are.
Such notions may seem vague, and often the ultimate
ends sought by political action are rather cloudy
and imprecise. What, after all, was “communism”
in Marxist theory really supposed to mean? Poetry
in the morning and jackhammer in the afternoon, as
Marx more or less once put it? It is likely even Marx
did not really know. But clearly it was aimed at the
eventual “liberation of all mankind,” not a minor task.
Or what about the “thousand year Reich” of the Nazis?
How could any rational person believe that one could
predict history for a thousand years? Yet millions of
Germans apparently did in the 1930s. And tens and
tens of millions of people died from the pursuit of such
illusions.46 But rationalism was not a hallmark of the
so-called “Third Reich.” One young Nazi explained at
the time: “One does not die for a program that one can
understand, one dies for a program that one loves.”47
Many young totalitarians of other political persuasions
could say the same thing. Indeed, as one British Muslim
said of the 2005 London bombers, non-Muslims “need
to understand, al-Qa’ida is inside [in the heart].”48
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Not only totalitarians reach for the rhetorical stars
in animating their followers to pursue grand ultimate
goals. President Theodore Roosevelt attempted to
give America a new vision of its role in the world
with his “New Nationalism.” President Woodrow
Wilson wanted to enter World War I, among other
reasons, in order to “make the world safe for
democracy” by promoting self-determination and
republican government. President Franklin Roosevelt
told Americans that they were fighting World War II
not only in self-defense but in support of the “Four
Freedoms.” British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
characterized it as a struggle over civilization itself. We
have seen that President Kennedy articulated a vision
of a world made “safe for diversity.” Shortly after his
second inauguration in 2005, President George W. Bush
told a news conference, in support of the “Long War”
on Terrorism (LWT), that the United States would
pursue liberty globally, and that:
Because our own freedom is enhanced by the expansion
of freedom in other nations, I set out the long-term
goal of ending tyranny in our world. This will require
the commitment of generations. But we're seeing much
progress in our own time.49

Thus, a political grand strategy requires, as a necessary
yet insufficient component, an animating, unifying
political vision of why action needs to be taken50 and
sacrifices made, mixed with a belief in the necessity
of changing some element—or all elements for
totalitarians—of the status quo, that is, the existing
political order, domestically and/or internationally.51
If such a vision cannot be maintained credibly, support
for the pursuit of the strategy could dissipate, especially
if severe sacrifices are being asked of adherents.
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As noted, the animating, unifying vision for the
extremist Islamists is a unified Islamic world, under
strict sharia law, uncorrupted by Western, materialist,
or modernist political influences. Such a utopia is often
said to have existed in the distant past. Some versions,
such as that of “alleged” Jemaah Islamiya leader (he
denies he is the leader, or even that there is such an
organization), Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Bashir,
predict that eventually the entire world will have to
become Islamic, or there can be no peace.52 Osama
bin Laden has been a little more restrained, but in an
open address to the American people, in reply to his
self-posed question, “What do we want from you?”
answered at the top of the list: “The first thing we are
calling you to is Islam.”53 Such exalted ends, ranging
from survival to transforming the world, can be used
to justify some very nasty means if the political entity is
so inclined, as in Bali54 or 9/11, especially if it is driven
by self-defined desperation.
Ways and Means.
The extremist Islamists utilize a variety of means
in pursuit of their goals, ranging from simple
proselytization to suicide bombing involving mass
murder. A recitation of their variety would serve no
purpose here, and is undoubtedly accessible to anyone
who has seen the headlines in any country over the last
decade or so, and especially since 1988 when extremist
Islamist networks rapidly expanded globally. They run
the gamut from the very crude, as in the October 2005
Bali bombings, to the sophisticated, as in 9/11 or the
Madrid bombings. But it would be a mistake to believe
that the sometimes crude technology used demonstrates
that the extremist Islamists lack the capacity for
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destruction or maintaining global networks. Many of
the new Islamists tend to be sophisticated technically
and computer savvy, and these means of projecting
their message is also very important in their political
strategy.55 Indeed, many of them are engineers or other
technically trained professionals.56
The technology issue also affects the “battle of
ideas.” The ability to communicate instantly and
globally is an important means for pursuing the
Islamist political grand strategy, and differentiates the
new terror from similar past calls for a transnational
ummah. The technical sophistication of modern
Islamists thus separates them from their predecessors.
Osama bin Laden publicly has made a similar point
himself.57 Al-Qa’ida, for example, uses the open
sources of the internet for effective and inexpensive
intelligence gathering. An extremist Islamist training
manual captured in Afghanistan declared that, "Using
public sources openly and without resorting to illegal
means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all
information required about the enemy."58
The spreading means of modern mass communications such as the internet, compact discs,
cell phone technology, and satellite television also
have expanded the opportunities and processes of
recruitment. Thus, the ability to spread the radical
Islamist message in the communications age has
greatly increased its potential influence. Some analysts
have explored the emergence of what could be called a
virtual ummah with global reach that not only quickens
the sharing of information and transcends national
borders, but also projects an Islamist civilizational
identity that is used for recruitment.59 The construction
of a web site called “The Voice of the Caliphate” has
been completed.60 Would-be extremist Islamists can
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now swear an actual blood oath to Osama bin Laden
online.61 The Islamists also are becoming more proactive
in developing electronic warfare techniques.62
The most interesting and terrifying thing about the
means that are allowed in the radical Islamist political
grand strategy is that, at least rhetorically, they are only
limited by the capabilities that the terrorists possess.
In other words, if greater capability of destruction can
be acquired, no obvious internal scruples or external
moral considerations exist that would prevent them
from using them against their enemies. In almost every
instance, captured or failed terrorists have proclaimed
that the purpose of their terrorist act was to kill as
many people as possible.
Ramzi Yousef, for example, one of the masterminds
of the first bombing of the World Trade Center in
1993, stated in captivity that he wished to kill tens of
thousands of Americans. He was deeply disappointed
when “only” six were killed.63 Osama bin Laden has
been quoted by a follower as saying that when he
obtains nuclear weapons, he will visit a “Hiroshima” on
the United States.64 The radical Islamists’ demonstrated
lack of concern for human life, even Muslim lives, is so
extreme it may have begun to cause a backlash among
many formerly sympathetic or neutral Muslims.65 Even
Osama bin Laden’s close friend and brother-in-law,
and the man who set up his network of organizations
in the Philippines in the 1980s and 1990s, Jamal Khalifa,
has apparently reached a breaking point, whether for
prudential or moral reasons: “Osama is doing these
things, which (sic) it’s not logical, not Islamic, and not
even strategic. I’m very sorry. I love him. I really love
him, but really he is doing very big mistakes (sic). He
is really destroying the image of Islam.”66
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Enemies and Politics.
One of the primary functions of a political grand
strategy is to help identify potential or real enemies.
This task cannot be accomplished through balance of
power analysis alone, as realpolitik theories suggest.
As has often been noted elsewhere, the United States
looks at Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons very
differently than it would, for example, Iran’s. Similarly,
during the Cold War the United States did not feel
threatened by the French or British nuclear deterrents,
but was notably threatened by the Soviet and Chinese
nuclear deterrents.
These perceptions have less to do with the
possession of nuclear weapons per se than with the
perceived intentions and political nature of the nations
possessing them. Power analysis is crucial to prioritizing
enemies, but far less important for defining them in
the first place. Defining an enemy is based on three
major criteria: 1) a potentially threatening capacity
for violent attack; 2) a perception of hostile intentions;
and, 3) a ruling ideology that is seen as quite distant
and hostile.67 The extremist Islamists encompass all
three characteristics for the United States, as does the
United States for the radical Islamists, even though the
civilizational Islamists no longer have a state to call
their own with their political expulsion from Sudan
and their military defeat in Afghanistan. In recent
years, Iran apparently has been trying to fill that void.
Thus the totalitarian nature of the Islamist belief
system, and the political grand strategy that follows
from it, views all nonbelievers as defined by them
as enemies. Like totalitarians before them, they have
declared war on most of the world, including, in their
case, most of the Muslim world.
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RADICAL ISLAMIST POLITICAL
GRAND STRATEGY
The Theory: “Near” and “Far” Enemies.
Radical Islamist political grand strategy has
evolved over time. In its original manifestation, the
reason for the deterioration of the Islamic world
was viewed as primarily internal, the “near enemy,”
although external, non-Islamic factors, the “far enemy,”
obviously played a role. But how indigenous, largely
secularist internal forces interacted with those external
factors, and insufficiently resisted their influences,
was the main cause of their immediate discontent.
This was not the least because those internal secularist
forces were repressing them politically as obstacles to
modernization. The focus of their strategy originally
therefore was internal-external (“near”-“far”) rather
than external-internal (“far”-“near”).68 This was to
change over time due to intervening events.
Following World War II, much of the Muslim
world was liberated from colonialism as the European
empires gradually dissolved. This, of course, led to the
question of what was to replace the colonial systems.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant paradigm was
generally a secularist, nationalist path of imitation
of Western patterns of societal organization along
authoritarian lines, with notable exceptions such as
the theocracy in Saudi Arabia. Characteristic leaders
of this type were represented by men such as Egypt’s
Gamal Adbel-Nasser and Indonesia’s Sukarno.69 Marc
Sageman has argued that the humiliating defeat in the
1967 war with Israel discredited the secularist imitative
model of development in the minds of many Muslims,
especially among the young.70 Radical Islamist authors
such as Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Hasan
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al-Banna (1906-49), Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi (190379), and Sayyid Qutb (1903-66) became influential with
the younger generation of students.71 The fact that Qutb
was tortured and executed by Nasser for his radicalism
made him something of a martyr, and discredited
the secularists even more in the eyes of many young
extremists.72
In a necessarily simplified overview, the Islamist
historical argument, steeped in an idealized past,
generally goes something like what follows.73 Islam
was great in medieval times, but in recent centuries,
and especially after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire
in World War I, has fallen on especially hard times.
The best way to return to the days of Islamic greatness
is to return to the “true” Islam of the earlier period,
unsullied by modernism and Western notions of the
individual, feminism, and the rule of man-made laws.
In this sense, radical Islamism, as defined among these
adherents, is opposed rigidly to democracy, socialism,
capitalism, equality of the sexes, and, in some cases,
nationalism. All of these modernist ideologies are
decadent, introduced to the ummah by infidels, and
aimed at dividing and conquering Islam. Thus, the
Islamists see the various competing ideologies of
modernity as largely responsible for the decline of
Islam relative to other civilizations, especially the West.
Since they are radically conspiratorially-minded, they
view the promotion in the ummah of modern forms of
political, economic, and social organization as part of a
plot to keep Muslims weak.
The “far enemy,” especially the Western “imperialists,” has taken advantage of the moral disarray
of post-colonial Islam, the narrative goes on, and
oppressed the Islamic peoples. Since independence
following World War II, the “far enemy” has exploited
them economically and politically through support for
22

secularist or apostate modernizing local governments
and ideologies in the Muslim world, i.e., the “near
enemy,” to keep believers divided and deprived of true
Islam, despite nominal independence.74 Among such
Islamists, including al-Qa’ida and Jemaah Islamiya,
even nationalism can be an enemy because it has
fractured the ummah.75 Who, after all, drew most of the
modern borders in the Muslim world? The “far enemy”
did so. And if you fanatically believe, as many radical
Islamists do, that virtually all actions taken by the West
are aimed at weakening the Muslim world, this charge
makes logical sense. To these militants, pro-nationalist
actions by the West and the “near enemy” are still part
of a broader conspiracy. Thus modern development
and Globalization are not part of the solution for the
Muslim world’s suffering to the Islamists, but the crux
of the problem. Cheery promises of future material
progress through Globalization, even if supported by
performance, therefore do not appeal to them. Their
hatred of the status quo is far more ideological and
theological than material.76
Specifically, what we are concerned with here are
those groupings of Islamists who are attempting to
transform the communal and nationalist identities
of Muslim populations, often with objective and
understandable communal and national grievances,
into those of a transnational, “superordinate” identity77
of, to borrow Benedict Anderson’s concept of the
nation, a transnational “imagined community” of
radical Islamist Muslims.78 Anderson argues that such a
community is imagined “because the members of even
the smallest nation will never know most of their fellowmembers, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the
minds of each lives the image of their communion.”79
The virtual ummah of modern communications and the
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internet makes the transnational community far easier
to imagine and enjoin loyalties.
The new radicals, although varied in a number of
ways, shared this vision of the problems facing the Islamic
world: the indigenous governments that had replaced
colonialism—the “near enemy”—had moved too far away
from Islamic norms, were cooperating with and aping
the former oppressors—the “far enemy”—while leading
the “sedentary”80 Muslim masses down the wrong path,
and causing a moral crisis in the ummah that led to the
humiliation of the Islamic peoples. Since the most serious
primary problem was internal to the societies involved
and morally-based, it affected the entire Muslim world,
not merely the Arab world or particular countries.81 Thus
the new radicalism began to emerge as a pan-Islamist
and civilizational movement rather than the pan-Arabist
or nationalist movements that one tended to see in the
first several decades after colonialism ended.
In the abstract, the ideal form of the Islamist political
grand strategy could be represented as shown in Figure
1.
Second Political Strategic Stage
(The Struggle for Civilizational Hegemony)
Civilizational Clash
“Far Enemy”
Unbelievers
Inherently
Anti-Muslim
Identity Clash I
“Near Enemy”
Secular Government
Man-made Laws

Identity Clash II
“Near Enemy”
Moderate Islam
Apostates

Identity Clash III
“Near Enemy”
“Sedentary Masses”
Potential Converts

First Political Strategic Stage
(The Struggle for Civilizational Unity)

Figure 1. Ideal Form of Islamist Political Grand Strategy.
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As the political grand strategy emerged in the 1950s
and 1960s, the first strategic stage was supposed to
consist of conquering the “near enemy” secular or
apostate governments in Muslim nations, followed by
confrontation of the “far enemy” with a unified ummah.
The Soviet military presence in the region beginning in
1979 shifted that sequence to fighting the “far” enemy
first. The growing American presence after 1991 shifted
priorities once more to fighting both the “near” and
“far” enemies simultaneously.
Of course, these typologies overlap, and we again
are generalizing from some of the plans of the most radical Islamist groups, but these simultaneous conflicts
over identity questions represent the ideational
template or framework within which the violence
of much Islamist terror is being waged. Other nonMuslim civilizations are deemed enemies also, but
the West, and especially the United States, being the
most powerful and the most involved in supporting
secularist and moderate governments in Muslimdominant countries, is the first among equals among
the “infidels.”82
The proposed attacks on the “near enemy” entail
fundamental shifts in identity such that it is only
partially a strategy of violence. It also entails propaganda, theological confrontation, formal and informal
education, and recruitment. Thus, an inner struggle in
the Muslim world exists over religious identities and
over the role of secularism in that identity. Osama bin
Laden’s standard of who is a believer predictably is
quite severe: if any Muslim offers even one word in
“helping the infidels,” he is deemed a nonbeliever,
that is, an infidel himself.83 Other top al-Qa’ida leaders
agree on the rigid codes of behavior. To Jordanian
terrorist Abbu Masab al-Zarqawi, the late leader of
al- Qa’ida in Iraq, democracy was also the enemy, and
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he declared a “bitter war” against it anywhere in the
ummah. Elections, representative government, and
popular sovereignty are the “essence of infidelity and
deviation from the true path.” Anyone promoting this
“malicious ideology” will be treated as an infidel and
dealt a death sentence.84
The radical Islamists want to eradicate secularism
and modernism from Muslim societies, while
maintaining many of the material benefits that
appear to be a product of such societies, and they see
Muslims who do not agree with this view as heretics
and apostates who are part of the problem. Although
clear differences with materialist and other religious
philosophies exist, Islamism has strong totalitarian
roots in its rigid exclusivity toward other systems of
thought and a similarly powerful in-group/out-group
hatred.85
Non-Islamist Muslims of the “near” enemy also can
be judged expendable in the struggle for the ummah. To
the terrorists of Jemaah Islamiya captured in Singapore
in 2002, for example, “even Muslims who did not
subscribe to militant jihad were seen as infidels.”86
Similarly, Zacarias Moussaoui, the French citizen who
was the so-called “twentieth hijacker” on 9/11, was
cited at his trial as believing that “it was Islamically
proper to engage in violent actions against ‘infidels’
(nonbelievers) even if others might be killed by such
actions, because if the others [i.e., other believers]
were ‘innocent,’ they would go to paradise, and if
they were not ‘innocent,’ they deserved to die.”87 Thus
even “sedentary,” innocent Muslims are expendable
in service to the Islamist cause, although they are not
targeted specifically.
It should be noted that this particularly radical
version of Islamism is not accepted by everyone in
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the extremist movement, not even everyone in the
al-Qa’ida-affiliated Southeast Asian group, Jemaah
Islamiyah. Although it is unclear how deep and wide
the divisions are, according to intelligence sources
and defectors, some factions in Jemaah Islamiya are
distinctly uncomfortable in killing other Muslims,
or even attacking secular governments of the “near
enemy.” This appears to be for both moral and
prudential reasons. The hard liners, on the other hand,
apparently see these deaths as necessary collateral
damage in their quest for theological purity and
civilizational greatness.88 Unfortunately, as one might
expect, the operational control over terror missions is
apparently in the hands of the hard liners.
Faced with this desperate status quo, as they see
it, and the frustration of not achieving their longterm vision of the ummah, according to the hard line
Islamist view, a wholesale Muslim cultural revolution
is necessary and can only be attained by the resurgence
of “true” Islam, which generally is defined as a form of
a radical Wahabbist/Salafist vision of sharia law, and
the complete rejection of “corrupt” and “damaging”
modernizing ideologies, of the West in particular.
The means, and the only means, to this end is violent
revolution leading to civilizational clashes.
The Multiple Roles of Social Identity in Islamist
Political Grand Strategy.
The radical Islamist political grand strategy is
based on its desire to reshape the identities of the entire
Islamic world. Identities make up a person’s very selfperception, and exist at multiple levels. They also can
vary greatly in intensity at various levels, and will be
invoked in some situations but not in others. Samuel
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Huntington explains in further detail, and it is worth
quoting him at length:
Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious
groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels
of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in
southern Italy may be different from that of a village
in northern Italy, but both will share in a common
Italian culture that distinguishes them from German
villages. European communities, in turn, will share
cultural features that distinguish them from Chinese or
Hindu communities. Chinese, Hindus, and Westerners,
however, are not part of any broader cultural entity.
They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the
highest cultural identity people have short of that
which distinguishes humans from other species. It is
defined both by common objective elements, such as
language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and
by the subjective self-identification of people. [Emphasis
added.]89

Huntington’s version of the clash of civilizations has
been controversial, yet very influential, both with those
who agree with it and those who disagree. The United
Nations (UN), for example, as early as 1998 named
2001 the “Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations”
in reaction to predictions of cultural clashes.90 More
recently, at the instigation of Spain, the UN has been
called on to create something called the “Alliance of
Civilizations” to help prevent such a clash.91 In France,
following the widespread Muslim rioting that afflicted
that country in late 2005, President Jacques Chirac
declared in January 2006: “In numerous countries,
radical ideas are spreading, advocating a confrontation
of civilizations."92 An anonymous French official
averred at the same time, “This is more than a clash of
civilizations. It is a cancer within our country that, if
unchecked, will destroy all of France.”93 In a poll taken
28

in Germany in May 2006, 61 percent believed that a
“clash of cultures” with Islam already had begun.94
The scent of civilizational clashes is in the air in the
early 21st century.
Yet Huntington’s concept of civilization as the
highest rung of the identity ladder is only partially
useful in understanding the ultimate goals of the
radical Islamists and the place of social identities in
their political grand strategy. He importantly leaves
out identities of groups that seek global hegemony or
universal dominion for their civilizational adherents.
He argues that the era of universalizing ideologies is
over,95 and the demise of the popularity of Leninism
and Fascism as “waves of the future” in the late 20th
century appears to bear this out. Yet the more visionary
versions of an extremist Islamist global ummah
demonstrate that social identities and the resulting
political goals do not always end at the particularistic
civilizational level as his theory predicts. Like some
ideologies, civilizational identities, especially if tied
to one of the world’s universalizing religions such
as Islam, will have universalistic aspirations, and
sometimes violent ones.
As noted, identities are elastic and malleable
concepts. Yet they can become so important to an
individual that they dominate his entire view of the
world and drive a majority of his actions. Huntington
argues that identities essentially are negative: “People
define their identity by what they are not.”96 But that
is too narrow a definition to understand the power
that identities can have over people. Identities are both
negative (I am American because I am not French) and
positive (I am American because I like being American.)
As the social psychologists put it, group identity is
made up of both the need to be different and the need
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to belong.97 Each need reinforces the other and can
create extreme in-group loyalty that can surpass other
identities such as community, family, and the like.
This behavior is not unique to radical Islamists or
the easily duped. When Eleanor Philby, wife of the
famous English communist spy Kim Philby, asked
him who came first, her and the children or the party,
Philby, an educated and sophisticated man, replied
unhesitatingly, “The Party, of course.”98 When one
puts in-group loyalty before even immediate family,
one’s identity as usually formed in most societies in
the world has been transformed radically. It is unlikely
that Philby made this transformation simply because
he identified as a noncapitalist—he was in love with
the Revolution more than his children. This extreme
kind of group loyalty, the kind that can lead people
to blow themselves up, also must be based on being
for something, and intensely so. It is important to
understand this mentality in order to understand the
threat we face.
Social identity can be usefully separated into
five general categories and levels: communal (i.e.,
familial, clan, tribal, and localist), national, regional,
civilizational, and, in its most vague manifestation,
global.99 The extremist Islamist political grand strategy
in its most radical form seeks to move the entire
Muslim world (minus their various excluded “near
enemy” members) up the identity ladder, starting
from its largely “sedentary” current state, moving to
national purification along radically Islamist-defined
sharia law, norms, and standards (their model appears
to the former Taliban government of Afghanistan),
then regionally, then to civilizational unity in the
Islamist ummah, and, in some versions, then to global
civilizational hegemony in the entire world.100
30

The al-Qa’ida-affiliated Abu Sayyaf group in the
Philippines arguably has exhibited this rough pattern
of evolution of social identities to the civilizational
level. Most of its original members came from the
Tausig tribe in Mindanao, and their original armed
conflicts with the Filipino government appear to
have been largely local and tribal. Infused with new
Islamist leadership from returning Jihadists in the late
1980s fresh from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan,
the group was created formally in 1991 and began a
terrorist campaign in favor of nationalistic separatism.
Finally, the Abu Sayyaf joined with al-Qa’ida, Jemaah
Islamiya, and other Islamist elements to coordinate
policies in pursuit of a “super-state” in Southeast Asia
comprised of all Muslims in the region that eventually
would join with the transnational ummah.101 The
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), another, larger
Filipino separatist terror group, arguably followed a
similar path of identity development,102 although if its
peace negotiations with the Filipino government at the
time of this writing are in good faith, the group may
well have abandoned that path.
Thus, the Abu Sayyaf Group and MILF roughly
have followed the desired path mapped out by the
extremist Islamist political grand strategy: communal
identity, to national identity, to civilizational identity,
to regional super state, to, perhaps, global civilizational
hegemony, at least as far as their ultimate political goals
go. It is a rare, yet striking, limited success story for the
extremist Islamist project, and if allowed to succeed
in the Philippines, undoubtedly would encourage the
group to try elsewhere, as well as giving it a territorial
base from which to try.
The radical Islamists certainly have been pursuing
such a political strategy. As Pakistan’s former prime
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minister, Benazir Bhutto, has put it, “[bin Laden] was
able to tap different youths in different regions on
different issues by pegging it all as a war between
Islam and the West, but, in fact, he was [worsening]
the regional conflicts for his own agenda, which was to
topple important Muslim countries and seize power for
himself.”103 This is the cynical view of an experienced
politician, but it has much truth in it. While correct
about the tactics that bin Laden has been utilizing,
Bhutto mistakenly sees bin Laden’s goal as merely
seeking power for himself. His real end game, as we
have seen, is creating a new Muslim transnational
political order based on strict sharia principles.
RADICAL ISLAMIST MILITARY
GRAND STRATEGY
The extremist Islamists have articulated a military
grand strategy that is integrated with the means and
ends of their political grand strategy. According to a
book entitled The Management of Barbarism, posted on
the internet by an al-Qa’ida organization, its military
strategy is planned to advance through three stages.104
The first is the “Disruption and Exhaustion” phase,
which is the period of the present. In this phase, the
goals are to: “a) exhaust the enemy's forces by stretching
them through dispersal of targets,” and “b) attract the
youth through exemplary targeting such as occurred
at Bali, Al-Muhayya and Djerba."
After Phase One succeeds in clearing a “zone” where
the Islamists are in control, the Second Phase, “The
Management of Barbarism” will ensue. This second
plan apparently was formulated in reaction to the
perceived mistakes made by the Taliban in Afghanistan
in the wake of the fall of the USSR. It calls for the
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rapid establishment of an Islamist order to: "establish
internal security, ensure food and medical supplies,
defend the zone from external attack, establish Shari'ah
(sic) justice, an armed force, an intelligence service,
provide economic sufficiency, defend against [public]
hypocrisy and deviant opinions and ensure obedience,
and the establishment of alliances with neighboring
elements that are yet to give total conformity to the
Management, and improve management structures."
Thus some Islamist ideologists view the record of the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan as having been in some
respects insufficiently totalitarian by not setting up sharia
law and a coercive, totalistic state quickly enough, and
they plan to correct that defect in the future. No moral,
theological, or social “barbarism” is to be allowed.
Once Phase Two is accomplished, the military
grand strategy calls for the extension of the new order
in Phase Three through repetition of the phases in an
“Empowerment” phase, as a self-expanding politicomilitary process. Eventually this process will encompass
the entire ummah, and, as noted in their political grand
strategy, they then will be ready to confront other
civilizations from a position of strength.105
Tactically, the strategy uses terrorist attrition to
wear down a stronger enemy, attacking soft targets
where possible (the book specifically suggests tourist
areas as targets), a classic insurgent test-of-wills
approach. As Stephen Ulph notes about the Islamist
strategy mapped out in the book, “After discussing the
necessity of establishing a proper chain of command,
in both the doctrinal and military fields, the [Islamist]
author outlines important military principles (striking
with the heaviest force at the weakest point; a
superior enemy is defeated by economic and military
attrition).”106
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Bin Laden himself has made clear that he views
his activities as an extended war of attrition over
generations, as an attempt to wear down the United
States through its strategic overextension. He also sees
his position as a win-win situation: if the Americans did
not react forcefully to 9/11 by invading Afghanistan,
for example, they would have been disgraced; if they
did invade Afghanistan they would exhaust themselves
materially, as had the Soviets. As Abu Bakr Naji notes in
the book The Management of Savagery, since the United
States, like the USSR, is a materialist-based culture, it
is inherently weak: “note that the economic weakness
from the burdens of war or from aiming blows of
vexation (al-nikaya) directly toward the economy is the
most important element of cultural annihilation since it
threatens the opulence and (worldly) pleasures which
those societies thirst for.”107
On a computer hard drive captured in Afghanistan,
a letter existed that bin Laden wrote to Afghani leader
Mullah Muhammad Omar on the issue of the American
response to 9/11 prior to the U.S. invasion of that
country:
Keep in mind that America is currently facing two
contradictory problems:
a) If it refrains from responding to jihad operations, its
prestige will collapse, thus forcing it to withdraw its
troops abroad and restrict itself to U.S. internal affairs.
This will transform it from a major power to a third-rate
power, similar to Russia.
b) On the other hand, a campaign against Afghanistan
will impose great long-term economic burdens, leading
to further economic collapse, which will force America,
God willing, to resort to the former Soviet Union’s only
option: withdrawal from Afghanistan, disintegration,
and contraction.108
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The consistent equation of the United States with
the former Soviet Union may prove to be one of the
Islamists’ biggest mistakes. They are not facing a
failing state. Yet strategic and economic overextension
remains a potential danger that could be exploited by
the enemy.
Thus, the Islamist political and military grand strategies are integrated intelligently and systematically
in a sophisticated synthesis of distinct political aims
and insurgent military traditions, despite the relative
novelty and seeming randomness of some of their
beastly bombing tactics. This is a highly educated,
disciplined, and trained enemy, not merely a group of
power-seeking renegade clerics with mere delusions
of grandeur as some, such as Benazir Bhutto, portray
them.
Explaining Radical Islamist Political
Grand Strategy in Practice.
As we have seen, the Islamist political grand
strategy is, at least in the abstract, a sequential one. In
stage one, the “near enemy” secularists and apostates
are to be defeated, the “sedentary” Muslims won over,
and a unified Islamist civilization created. Then a
second stage will commence: a confrontation with the
other civilizations around the globe which, in some of
the more frantic versions, will end with the triumph of
Islam everywhere in the world.
The former Soviet Union threw this sequence off
in 1979 by invading Afghanistan and creating the
necessity of a defensive jihad in that country. This
was followed by the largely Western invasion of Iraq
in 1991, and the subsequent placing of U.S. troops in
Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region as a deterrent
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against attack on the Saudis and as part of the sanctions
regime against Iraq that followed the war. These events,
among others, led to increasing attacks on Western,
Eastern, and African interests in the mid-1990s before
the ummah actually was united, or even close to it.109 In
the short run, these strikes against the powerful won
the Islamists admirers in the Muslim world, especially
among the young. The Osama bin Laden tee-shirt
became ubiquitous in many Muslim countries,110 and
even in the West among Muslim immigrants. The
radical Islamist strategy shifted gears in the early 1990s
and increasingly entailed attacking both the “near” and
“far” enemies.111 As chief al-Qa’ida ideologist Ayman
Muhammad al-Zawahiri put it in a post-9/11 book:
“. . . we reiterate that focusing on the domestic [i.e.,
“near”] enemy alone will not be feasible at this stage.”112
Things have not gone according to the extremist Islamist
plan, yet they have proved resourceful in adapting to
new conditions.
What Is the Appeal?
Why do these radical identity-driven ideas appeal to
some in the Muslim world? This is far too complicated
a subject to deal with adequately in this monograph,
but identity theories can offer analytical starting points
that can then be tested against the empirical evidence,
such as it is.
It is more likely that such a transformation of
group identity is done through the medium of religion
than through a secularist ideology.113 To embittered,
powerless people who tend to externalize their own
shortcomings and who have a seemingly endless
capacity for outrage, revolution and the attainment of
the certainty of paradise and God’s favor are powerfully
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positive inducements.114 To the young who, as we have
seen, are particular targets of Islamist recruiters, the
excitement of being part of a conspiratorial movement
and belonging to something larger than oneself in
fighting a hated enemy also can be a powerful draw.
They may be less likely to question the claims of
charismatic religious leaders. Selflessness and sacrifice
can seem to be especially noble to those young people
who see the world as corrupt and unjust.115
Thus statements by bin Laden, who gave up a very
privileged life to live in the Sudan and the wilds of
Afghanistan, in praise of the 9/11 terrorists, such as
“Victory is not material gain; it is about sticking to your
principles,” can be highly appealing to some idealistic
young people.116 “Revolutionary asceticism”117 among
leaders, whether real or feigned, constructive or
destructive, often has been an additional element
of charisma in their appeal, from Moses to Jesus
to Buddha to Gandhi to Lenin to Hitler to Ho. The
Islamists have used it to good effect in separating
themselves politically from what they portray as the
typical grubby “near enemy” politician who consorts
with the infidels and betrays Islam; that is, a politician
who must live and work in the real political world of
compromises and the “art of the possible.”
Evidence for the Existence of the Strategy.
One must include in an inquiry into the ultimate
goals of the radicals’ political grand strategy, the
question: How do we know that the Islamists seek a
clash of civilizations? The simple answer is: because
they say so. Such civilizational attitudes are openly and
often expressed by global Islamists. It should be again
emphasized that it is not being argued here that the
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Muslim world views reality this way at this time, but
that the radical Islamists themselves view it this way.
That is, the ultimate goal of the strategy is to create this
civilizational clash eventually, although some also say
it is already in progress.118
Thus, when asked directly by an interviewer in
October 2001 whether the Islamists were involved in
a Clash of Civilizations, bin Laden answered in the
affirmative:
I say that there is no doubt about this. This [clash of
civilizations] is a very clear matter, proven in the Qur’an
and the traditions of the Prophet, and any true believer
who claims to be faithful shouldn’t doubt these truths,
no matter what anybody says about them.119

In December 2004, bin Laden called on all Muslims to
“Resist the New Rome” and declared that “This conflict
and confrontation [with the infidels] will go on because
the conflict between right and falsehood will continue
until Judgment Day.”120 This clash of civilizations is
not to be limited to the West. In April 2006, bin Laden
heavily criticized those Muslims who denied that there
was an ongoing clash of civilizations, which included
not only the Jewish and Christian “crusaders,” but also
the “Buddhist pagans.”121 Bin Laden also has talked in
terms of the “Hindu enemy” in the past, and has called
on Pakistan to prepare enough nuclear weapons to
defeat it in Kashmir.122 There can be no peace between
the true believers and nonbelievers, according to this
view.
Osama Bin Laden’s counterpart in Southeast
Asia, the Emir Abu Bakar Bashir of Jemaah Islamiya,
recently agreed in a wide-ranging interview, although
he placed the conflict in the future, as in the original
strategic sequence:
38

It is true there will be a clash of civilizations. The
argumentation is correct that there will be a clash
between Islam and the infidels. There is no [example]
of Islam and the infidels, the right and the wrong, living
together in peace.123

When all Islam is united into a “truly” transnational
ummah under sharia laws, then the clash of civilizations
will, and must, occur. Bashir also has been quoted
as teaching, “Allah has divided humanity into two
segments, namely the followers of Allah and those
who follow Satan. . . . Between [the infidels] and us
there will forever be a ravine of hate, and we will be
enemies until you follow Allah’s law.”124
Al-Qa’ida’s designated leader in Iraq, the late Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, apparently agreed with Bashir. In
a tape released to his radical Islamist sympathizers
before he was killed, he made two demands before
he would end his terror: 1) remove all non-Muslims
from Palestine, Iraq, and any other Islamist-defined
Muslim lands; and 2) “install (sic) sharia on the entire
Earth and spread Islamic justice there. . . . The attacks
will not cease until after the victory of Islam and the
setting up of sharia.”125 Clearly this view encompasses
the sequential political grand strategy of the Islamists:
civilizational unity followed by civilizational hegemony
(a universalized global Islamist identity.) This vision
may seem excessively grandiose, but it is comparable
in scope and ambition to the ultimate aims of the
Leninists, for example.
These views are not just held by leaders and regime
strategists, but have seeped down to the lower ranks
of the radical Islamist movement. When Abdul Hakim
Murad, a terrorist compatriot of Ramzi Yousef, the
mastermind of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center, was asked by his Filipino interrogators after his
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1995 arrest whether he was attacking the United States
because it was making trouble for “your country,” he
replied:
I’m not. I’m—look, I’m not looking for a country. I don’t
care about [a] country. We are Muslims. The United
States is making trouble for Muslims.126

Similarly, when captured Singaporean Islamists,
coming from a country that is not occupied by foreign
troops, where Muslims are in relative terms neither
marginalized nor oppressed, and where socioeconomic conditions are among the highest in the
region, were questioned by psychiatrists, they were
found to be spiritually and economically motivated,
including concern for helping the broader ummah.127
National liberation per se did not figure into their most
important motivations.
There is even a racist element to this civilizational
conflict among some Islamists. When asked why they
had killed Australians rather than Americans, one of
the 2002 Bali, Indonesia bombers flippantly answered,
“Australians, Americans, whatever—they are all white
people.”128
Radical Islamism and Nationalism: A Critique
of the National Liberation Thesis.
These statements, and others like them among
captured Islamists, strongly suggest an emerging
civilizational identity among young radical Islamists
that takes precedence over any particular national
identity, although Afghanistan under the Taliban, as
the “only” Islamist state in the world and home of
al-Qa’ida, was given a special place in their loyalties.
Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban, lost that
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place and is now again an “infidel” country.129 Efforts to
appease such convinced civilizational Islamists along
nationalistic lines may “succeed” in the short term, but
are very likely to fail in the longer term because further
demands are inevitable until the ultimate transnational
goals are reached. National liberation is only a stepping
stone to civilizational and/or global liberation for the
radical Islamists, as it was for the Leninists. Islamism
ultimately is not about nationalist goals, although they
are important in the short term, but about civilizational
or global goals.
Thus, the thesis of Robert Pape, who has written a
recent influential book claiming that suicide terrorism,
though not necessarily other forms, is “primarily
nationalistic, not religious,” overlooks the continued
importance of religious-based and transnational
terrorism when that thesis is applied to radical
Islamism more generally.130 If one looks at aggregate
terrorist incidents, not just suicide terror as U.S.
strategists must, including attacks on property and
failed attempts without casualties, the picture changes
somewhat. According to the State Department’s
“Worldwide Incidents Tracking System,” in 2005
there were 5,378 global terrorist incidents, using a far
broader classification than suicide bombing alone.
Of these, 1,101 were religiously based, 3,298 were
secularly (but not necessarily nationalistic) based, and
979 were of unknown origin.131 While it is true that
terrorism remains primarily secular, religious-based
terror also remains an important aspect of the problem.
Pape’s thesis also has not had much predictive power.
Since Pape’s original presentation of the thesis in 2003,
suicide terrorism has been “frequently more religiously
motivated.”132
Moreover, such violence by al-Qa’ida and its
supporting groups can be both nationalistic and
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religious, but it is always in service to broader longterm transnational extremist Islamist goals. Pape also
claims, “every group mounting a suicide campaign
over the past 2 decades has had as a major objective—
or as its central objective—coercing a foreign state
that has military forces in what terrorists see as their
homeland to take those forces out.”133 While this claim
may have some surface plausibility, when applied to
the real world as policy analysis, it loses much of its
analytical value. This is especially true if you include
Southeast Asia and other parts of the ummah outside
of the Middle East, something Pape only partially
attempts.
As Pape’s analysis makes note, suicide bombing
from 1980 to 2001 comprised only 3 percent of overall
terrorist attacks, although it can claim an inordinate
percentage of the casualties (48 percent; this figure
excludes 9/11 to prevent skewing the results).134
Casualties are an important, but hardly the only,
measure for defining the threat of terrorism. And a
general counterterrorism strategy should not be based
on a relatively small portion of the overall capabilities
and aims of the terrorists. Some of the latest evidence at
the time of this writing, including the strategy of Naji
quoted above, suggests that the Islamists are switching
somewhat to economic targets in a “bleed-untilbankruptcy” long-term strategy, which is unlikely to
entail suicide bombings.135 Suicide bombings are thus
but a small part of the overall terrorist threat.
In Southeast Asia specifically, a region in which Pape
ignores examples crucial to the study of terrorism,136
this analysis does not seem to apply, given the relative
rarity of suicide bombings there. But even if we look
at his analysis within the context of suicide bombings
in the region, it does not explain the Indonesian Bali
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suicide bombings by Jemaah Islamiya—a transnational,
not merely national group—which were aimed at the
tourist industry and the “near enemy” of the Indonesian
government as much as the “far enemy” of Australia.137
Nor does it explain some of the other suicide terror
bombings in Indonesia, which were along sectarian
religious lines, not nationalistic ones. There are no
foreign troops occupying Indonesia, and there have
not been any since the early 1950s when the Dutch
left. Pape’s theory also apparently does not explain
the radical Islamist suicide bombings that began to
escalate in Bangladesh in late 2005. These attacks were
aimed at a secularist government in an Islamic country
that does not have any foreign troops stationed in it, or
any important contested territorial claims. The suicide
bombing campaign began after local Islamic militants
connected with radical Islamist transnational ones.138
More importantly, the suicide terrorism-asnational-liberation thesis ignores the entire ideological
framework of the Islamist political grand strategy.
What the radical Islamists want to do is rid the Muslim
world of any foreign presence or influence—commercial,
cultural, political, social, ideological, ideational—not
merely military occupation or strategic cooperation
with the “near enemy.” As we have seen, they have
made this repeatedly evident. Thus removing troops
and moving to an “offshore” military strategy will not
solve the problem.
If we do not understand this, we cannot understand
their values-based frames of reference from which
their actions flow.139 Realpolitik analysis may tell us
something about the Islamist military or political
tactics, but precious little about their grand military
and political strategies, which are far more ambitious
in purging non-Islamist influences as an absolute
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value. An understanding of those strategies is much
more useful for explaining how Islamists choose and
prioritize their enemies, and in demonstrating their
much larger strategic ambitions. In this instance,
ideational analysis trumps materialist analysis,
although both are necessary to explain radical Islamist
behavior.
Once again, ideational elective affinities with
Leninism as a kindred totalitarian ideology can be
instructive in understanding the politics of Islamism on
the nationalism issue. In some fundamental ways, this
political grand strategy resembles that of Leninism after
1917, and perhaps other totalitarian ideologies at other
times. Leninists were in favor of “national liberation”
from Western (i.e., in their case non-Leninist) influence
(as are the radical Islamists), but only as a first stage
that would then free the new Leninist states, with all
alternative belief systems completely purged, to join
in the larger community of socialist states that would
then disappear into a unified global community.
Eventually, all alternative ways of thinking would
disappear, including the nationalist one. This appears
to be the same sequential strategy that the most radical
Islamists, the ones most responsible for terrorism, also
adopt but for ideational not materialist reasons.
There are, of course, as many differences between
Leninist materialism and Islamist spiritualism as there
are similarities. Yet in terms of basic political grand
strategies, especially the tactical use of nationalism as a
first stage to set up a larger, transnational community,
distinct similarities exist. To stop at the nationalist
identity as a frame of reference is to miss the point of
radical Islamist ideology.
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Why Do They Hate Us?
Although the entire non-Muslim world makes up the
“far enemy,” the primary target of this grand strategy
with the collapse of the Soviet Union ultimately became
the United States, “the head of global unbelief”140 as
bin Laden calls it. The United States is also identified
by the radical Islamists and others as the leader of the
post-Cold War spread of Neoliberal economic and
political values, which they loathe, under the concept of
Globalization. The introduction or spread of such values
and practices into agrarian or partially industrialized
societies can seriously challenge traditional societal
relationships. Traditional and modern societies are
relatively stable. But the actual movement from the
former to the latter is often profoundly destabilizing
and disruptive.141 It was so for Western societies which
had decades and sometimes centuries to adjust. It is
even more so for the traditional societies of the nonWestern world which are undergoing these changes at
an unprecedented rate of speed. These transnational
forces, especially the economic ones, have not left the
Muslim world untouched.
Since Neoliberalism emphasizes limited government to help maintain global economic competitiveness, social safety nets sometimes have proved inadequate in sheltering the lowest socio-economic classes,
or particular sectors of the economy such as farming.142
This has placed new challenges on the national
legitimacy of some governments, rather than the
predicted alleviation of ethnic conflict and increased
legitimacy associated with Neoliberal modernization
theory.143 This has not only meant further economic
marginalization of already alienated groups, but has
created what could be called a value vacuum. As
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Turkish scholar Michael Mousseau notes generally of
the effects of the intrusion of Globalized markets in
traditionalist rural areas: “A society with clientalist
values and beliefs but with fading protections from
[communal identity] in-groups is extremely vulnerable
to any in-group system that promises to put an end
to its deep sense of insecurity.”144 The Islamists are
trying to exploit those endemic communal insecurities
in national, regional, and civilizational terms. Not too
much should be made of this in the long run, as the
effects of Globalization (e.g., foreign direct investment
and joint ventures) are associated statistically with a
lessening of terrorist activity.145 But they may give the
terrorists a short-term advantage as change is often
materially and psychologically disruptive.
There were factors at play in Muslim anger at
America other than contrasting ideologies or its
symbolic importance as the leader of Globalization, of
course, including specific U.S. foreign policies, which
led it to emerge as the first among peers among the “far
enemies” to the militants. American support of Israel,
the invasion of Iraq to expel it from Kuwait in the First
Gulf War in 1991, the subsequent sanctions regime
against Iraq (which Islamists were as angry over as the
2003 invasion—the sanctions regime against Iraq was
no more acceptable to them),146 the placing of U.S. troops
in the sacred land of Saudi Arabia, the abandonment of
Afghanistan to the militants in the early 1990s following
the defeat of the Soviets, American support for the
secularist “near enemy” governments in the Middle
East and in South and Southeast Asia, and America’s
image as the secularist leader of the Neoliberal order
emerging from the Cold War, all made it virtually
inevitable that those who believed as the militants do
would see the United States as the main obstacle to
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creating a global Muslim community, and the premier
corruptor of the “near enemy.”
When President Bush, Prime Minister John Howard,
and Prime Minister Tony Blair declare that the Islamists
hate the West for its values, they are right. But that
is not the only reason they attack Western interests.
They attack them, and will continue to do so as long
as they exist, because of the corrupting influence the
West represents in the “near enemy” and therefore in
keeping the Muslim world divided, in their view.
The Gradual Erosion of the American
Deterrent Globally.
The supportive policies of the United States for
the governments in the Muslim world, Israel, or the
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were not all that
convinced the Islamists to bring the war to the “far
enemy.” A growing contempt for American power also
was entailed. Although many American academics
insist that the loss in Vietnam did little harm to
America’s reputation as a superpower, the results
of that disaster are still with us. In addition, several
precipitous subsequent withdrawals in various “hot
spots” and the lack of coordinated responses to terrorist
attacks in the 1980s and 1990s apparently convinced
the Islamists that the United States was vulnerable, in
Maoist language, a “paper tiger.”
Bin Laden made this clear when he taunted the
Americans in a 1996 document addressed to thenSecretary of Defense William Perry:
Where was this courage of yours when the explosion in
Beirut took place in 1983 . . . (sic) You were transformed
into scattered bits and pieces at that time; 241 soldiers
were killed, most of them Marines. And where was this
courage of yours when two explosions made you leave
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Aden in less than 24 hours! . . . (sic) [Y]ou moved tens
of thousands of international forces, including 28,000
American soldiers, into Somalia. However, when tens
of your soldiers were killed in minor battles and one
American pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu,
you left the area in disappointment, humiliation, and
defeat, your dead with you. . . . It was a pleasure for
the heart of every Muslim and a remedy to the chests of
believing nations to see you defeated in the three Islamic
cities of Beirut, Aden, and Mogadishu.147

Bin Laden also predictably refers to the American
withdrawal from Vietnam in his litany of “retreats.”148
This view of the political will of the United States, and
the West in general, virtually invites the “Disruption
and Exhaustion” and test of wills tactics noted earlier
in radical Islamist political and military strategies.
Prior to the 2003 Gulf War, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein
held remarkably similar views.149 In spite of academic
skepticism, reputations matter greatly in international
politics.150
It does not take too much imagination to predict how
the extremist Islamists would interpret a precipitous
American withdrawal from either Afghanistan or Iraq
in the current period. Al-Qa’ida’s chief ideologist, the
Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, recently has
stated that a victory for the Islamists in Iraq would
lead to the immediate expansion of its operations
transnationally into Syria, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and
Egypt.151 So much for the “national liberation from
occupied territory” hypothesis, at least according to
Islamist leaders’ declared policy plans. Claims that
“fewer and fewer” people would pay attention to bin
Laden’s claims of “appeasement” with an American
military withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula are
hardly reassuring given this history.152 Some antiIraqi war critics actually have used the withdrawals in
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Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1993, those that bin
Laden himself uses to ridicule American resolve, as
models for altering current policies in Iraq.153
This new militancy especially became apparent
after the American role in the 1991 Gulf War and
the stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia. As we have
seen, the Islamists could no longer wait until the
“near enemy” was defeated and the radical Islamist
ummah created. The “far enemy” had to be attacked
simultaneously in defense of the Islamic world. For
this reason, according to former Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the removal of American
troops from Saudi Arabia was “huge” in making the
decision to invade Iraq in 2003:
[U.S. troop] presence there over the last twelve years
has been a source of enormous difficulty for a friendly
government. It’s been a huge recruiting device for
al-Qa’ida. In fact if you look at bin Laden, one of his
principal grievances has been the presence of crusader
forces on the holy land, Mecca and Medina.154

Removing U.S. forces in Arabia by placing them
elsewhere in the ummah, of course, will not work
in appeasing the ire of al-Qa’ida. Only an entire
withdrawal of all “infidel” influence from the entire
Muslim world could accomplish that, and even then
there would be historical bitterness mixed with Islamist
triumphalism with which to deal. Thus far, bin Laden,
et. al., do not seem to have added the withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia publicly to their list of
American “retreats.”
When mixed with the heady experience of “causing”
the collapse of the hated atheistic Soviet superpower
by defeating it in Afghanistan, this perception of
weak American political will led to certain delusions
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of grandeur among many in the Islamist movement.
Bin Laden was quoted as saying, “Having borne arms
against the Russians in Afghanistan, we think our battle
with America will be easy in comparison.”155 Thus
began the attacks on the United States and its interests
throughout the 1990s and after, to take advantage of
its supposed weakness. It remains to be seen if this
strategy works.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The categorical imperative of American political
grand strategy in the LWT must be: The conflict with
the radical Islamists cannot be allowed to reach
civilizational proportions generally, and all other
policies must be aimed at this fundamental goal. If
it is allowed to become so, a significant portion of the
world’s population will be perpetually at war with us,
threatening lives and liberties both in the United States
and abroad. The LWT therefore involves threats to our
core values at multiple and complex levels that are
not fixable by going after our enemies militarily, and
certainly not by trying to appease them. The war must
be fought “indirectly” as well in the realms of economics, ideology, value pluralism, and social justice.156 We
must reward moderation and punish extremism. There
are those that argue that any civilizational dialogue must
be carried out at the civic societal, not governmental,
level, that is, from the bottom up.157 There may be a
good deal of merit in that idea. Certainly a great deal
of suspicion of government-to-government programs
exists in many Muslim-majority nations. As noted
above, a recent quantitative study suggests that Western
economic relations in the Muslim areas are correlated
with a reduction in terrorist activity, raising questions
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about the assumption that economic Globalization
measures feed the monster. On the other hand, a
perception of military dependence on an outside Great
Power correlates with increases in terrorist activities.158
Thus the American military “footprint” should be kept
to an absolute minimum. Yet there are also proactive
programs that governments can implement to support
those other efforts.
Social Identity Outreach Programs.
The underlying argument of this monograph is that
mainstream Muslims around the world are in danger
of becoming the victims of collective identity theft.
If this identity theft is to be prevented, supporting
moderate alternatives to Islamism will be crucial in
the war of ideas so crucial to the LWT. This is a most
sensitive subject for obvious reasons. An obvious or
discovered covert operation in this area would be
disastrous and destroy much of the good work that has
been accomplished already. Support for mainstream
clerics and governments in the public sphere could
include the following: speaking tours for mainstream
clerics in the United States; promoting communications
between mainstream American Muslim associations
and the moderates elsewhere; scholarships for Muslim
students at universities in the United States where
their sensibilities will be respected; more training
for foreign security forces inside the United States;
and any other public actions that will not so identify
mainstream Muslims with the United States that it
will undermine their credibility and legitimacy. To the
extent that we can, the goal should be to enhance that
credibility and legitimacy, especially in the relatively
new democracies such as Indonesia, Thailand, the
Philippines, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
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elsewhere. Our support for fledgling democracies
must be unswerving and generous.
American outreach programs have been criticized
justifiably as being out of touch with the cultures and
sensibilities of the target audiences.159 They have tended
to concentrate on short-term programs to convince
foreigners that Muslims are treated fairly in the United
States or what are seen, often from an ethnocentric
point of view, as some of the more positive aspects of
American life. These can be fixed by more culturally
informed policies, and may be necessary to offset
radical Islamist propaganda. But they are in no way
sufficient to win the war of ideas. This task is severely
complicated by the negative treatments of American
values and alleged social realities in Hollywood movies,
rap music, and the like, that are very popular overseas
in some circles and detested in others. A wholesale
program of informational outreach is needed, including
in American Muslim communities, to combat the
outrageous lies that continue to proliferate, even in
countries with free media and relatively high degrees
of education as in Europe. As in the Cold War, we
must make compellingly clear, at home and abroad,
the valuational contrast between ourselves and our
enemy, between freedom and oppression.160 But we
also must be willing to accept that other values, such
as economic justice, equality, and mutual respect, for
example, also must be part of the effort to convince our
allies that liberal pluralism is the best way to approach
those goals. It is likely that much of the non-Western
world, if it democratizes, will lean towards forms of
European-style social democracy rather than the liberal
democracy favored in the United States. Whether the
rest of the world likes us or copies us is not as important
as ensuring they know the potential consequences
involved in the Islamists winning the LWT.
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Yet one must be cautious and do one’s homework
before following such an “attraction” strategy. In
Britain, for example, the government sponsored a
tour of “moderate” Islamic clerics around the United
Kingdom, but it turned out that many of them had
radical backgrounds and ended up preaching militant
policies.161 The choices of who should participate
should be left to the indigenous governments who are
familiar with the cultural terrain, even though in this
instance the British government apparently was not.
Our goal must be to support the indigenous forces
of relative moderation where they exist, not try to
intervene directly ourselves.
Although warriors and hard-bitten diplomats
sometimes disparage the “softer” aspects of a strategic
relationship, such as perceptions of mutual respect,
cultural sensitivities, and the like, they can be very
important in relations with less-developed nations
still smarting culturally over the humiliation and
exploitation of historical imperialism. They cost us
virtually nothing. An example of this can be seen in
the Bush administration’s new sensitivity to Indonesia,
the largest Muslim nation in the world, which has had
a very positive effect on relations, both governmental
and in civic society. For example, the recent initiatives
emanating from Washington toward Indonesia brought
this response from Din Syamsuddin, chairman of
Muhammidiyah, Indonesia's second largest mainstream
Muslim organization:
The main cause of this poor relationship is because the
West connects Islam to terrorism. But my feeling is that
the relationship is beginning to change in Indonesia.
This might be in part because the U.S. foreign policy
toward Indonesia recently has been to look at Indonesia,
being a large Muslim country, as a friend and strategic
partner instead of an enemy and a threat. It is changing
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now because there is a lot of cooperation between
many U.S. agencies with Muslim organizations, like
my organization, in Indonesia. We have been working
together. We are now engaged in a partnership.162

This positive direction has recently been funneled into
a more difficult political context given the events in the
Middle East in mid-2006. But the potentialities, at least
in some Muslim societies, may reappear in the future.
Promote “Dual Identities” and “Attraction/Attrition”
Strategies.
The United States should promote a moderate
nationalism to combat the ideational appeal of radical
transnational Islamism. Policies such as the “dual
identity” approach—part national, part communal163—
of the current Indonesian and Filipino governments
toward Muslim separatist movements appear to
be working at the time of this writing in making
civilizational solutions less appealing.164 The relatively
singular nationalist approach of the government of
Thailand appears to be in trouble at the time of this
writing.165 Yet seeking “dual identity” solutions, what
one scholar calls ethnofederalism, is also a risky policy for
the governments involved, and for the United States.
More cultural and political autonomy conceivably
might increase separatist sentiments and violence in the
longer run, thereby creating potential opportunities
for the extremist Islamists.166 That is why governments
often are reluctant to implement them. But the use
of “search and destroy” military-style “attrition”
strategies alone over decades has not worked in any of
these countries, has led to many deaths on both sides,
complicating attempts at unity, and already has led
to increased political opportunities for the Islamists.
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This appears to be the pattern in Thailand today. The
combined attraction/attrition strategies inherent in the
“dual identity” approach have done much better at
stabilizing the situations, at least in the short run.
The “dual identity,” ethnofederalist approach is an
attempt to fuse communal and national identities,
rather than placing them in direct conflict and causing
the rejection of the national communities’ norms and
standards of citizenship by fanning in-group hatred.
In other words, a nationalist Muslim is assumed to
be less likely to become a separatist or civilizational
Muslim if equal political loyalty is to country as
much as to clan or global ummah, or at least that is the
hope. And civilizational Islamism, rather than Islamic
nationalism, poses the greater threat to American
interests. The radical Islamists detest such a notion
as “dual identity.” Indeed, the influential Islamist
theoretician, Sayyid Qutb, called such diversity of
loyalties “hideously schizophrenic” in the 1950s.167 His
radical disciples of today have shown similar contempt
for multiculturalism. They desire, instead, a rigid,
totalitarian uniculturalism.
Following policies meant to encourage primary
identities to remain at the localist or communal level
might also be an option, but it also is filled with
difficulties and risks. First, it risks hindering economic
growth and development. Second, it will probably be
seen by nationalist elites, in former colonial countries
especially, as attempts to hold back their societies.
It conceivably could cause them to drift toward the
radical Islamists. Third, it is doubtful that such a policy
would hold the support of the American public over
time. Nonetheless, there may be cases in which there
is no national identity that can readily be appealed
to, for example in “failing states.” In a “failing state,”
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no central governance exists, and communal and
localist identities tend to predominate, with national
identities contested or rejected. In such cases, perhaps
the least poor solution might be to support subnational
communal groups in order to achieve the short-term
security goal of preventing a state supporting terrorism
from forming, as occurred recently in Somalia.168 There
is, of course, no guarantee that it will work in any case,
as there is none for the other levels of identity.169 Thus
a subnational social identity may be the only solution
available in certain cases, but it is a short-term policy at
best.
Similarly, attempting to manipulate the intraMuslim identity along Shia and Sunni fault lines is
unambiguously risky and might actually have the effect
of unifying the two against the non-Muslim world. It
is interesting to note that al-Qa’ida virtually ignored
using the terms Shia and Sunni in its pronouncements
prior to their attempt to instigate a sectarian war in
Iraq in 2005. The doctrinal emphasis prior to that time
was on Muslim unity across sectarian lines. With the
death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the al-Qa’ida leader
in Iraq, who apparently successfully helped instigate
such a sectarian conflict in that country, the overall
sectarian appeals have again become somewhat
obtuse. Yet these deep religious identity splits in
Islam are too volatile and unpredictable to warrant an
attempt to use them for political purposes. Neither the
West, nor perhaps anyone else, has the knowledge,
prestige, and intelligence to carry out such a plan of
manipulation.170
The promotion of “dual-identity” nationalism, or
ethnofederalism, is a risky policy, but allowing a drift
towards pan-Islamist extremism arguably is far riskier.
The United States therefore should subtly encourage
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moderate nationalist identities in the Muslim world,
even if at some cost to its own short-term interests. We
are strong and wealthy enough to do so. If identities
can be maintained at the national level, eschewing
civilizational warfare, the chances of gradually
integrating these nations into the global economy
to eliminate some of the underlying causes of their
discontent should improve.
The United States, for all of its faults and foibles,
also brings much to the table in its attempted creation
of a new world order based on liberal institutions,
domestically and internationally. The Islamists and
their movement oppose such developments, not only
in the realm of ideas, but also in the world of global
power. Liberalism, in the sense of liberal, marketoriented, democratic, and republican ideas, stands in
inherent ideational opposition to this movement. The
radical Islamists see such opposition in civilizational
identity terms. They base their political grand strategy
on this basic set of beliefs. As totalitarians, they cannot
accept the value pluralism of the polytheistic, liberal, or
secular humanist ideals. There is nothing to negotiate
with these people except our own surrender of values,
for it would take that to satisfy them. Each concession
to them will only lead to more demands until their
ultimate goal is achieved. As American negotiators
used to complain about the former Soviet Union:
“What’s theirs is theirs; what’s ours is negotiable.” It
is always thus with totalitarians. Those who counsel
otherwise do not understand properly the dynamics
of totalitarian social and political movements and the
belief systems upon which they are based.
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